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The Two Most Important Questions for Ethical Public Health*
John Coggon† and Lawrence O. Gostin‡
 
Abstract 
 
Public health ethics is a distinct and established field, and it is important that its approaches and 
rationales are understood widely in the public health community. Such understanding includes 
the capacity to identify and combine principled and practical concerns in public health. In this 
paper, we present a background to the ideas that motivate public health ethics as a field of 
research and practice, and rationalise these through a critical ethico-legal approach to analysis. 
Two essential points of inquiry are identified and formulated to allow philosophical and practical 
agendas regarding public health to be combined. These come through asking the theoretical 
question ‘what makes health public?’; and the practical question ‘how do we make health 
public?’. We argue that these two questions require to be addressed if we are to achieve a robust 
and rigorous, ethical public health. 
 
Introduction 
 
Public health rests on a moral mandate.1 This mandate as most commonly articulated falls in two 
parts: first, it includes an imperative to improve population health (maximising or optimising 
health as a particular social value); second, it includes a duty to mitigate unfair health inequalities 
(a commitment to principles of social justice).2 Given the inherence of ethics to public health, as 
a vocation and as a practice, it therefore can be said to reflect a social and political mission. As 
one of us has written elsewhere: 
 
The public health community takes it as an article of faith that health must be society’s 
overarching value. Yet politicians do not always see it that way […]. What is needed is a 
clear vision of, and rationale for, healthy populations as a political priority.3 
 
In accordance with the need presented in this quotation, the work of public health ethics, 
understood in its political context, is to explain and justify the moral mandate that drives public 
health policy, practice, research, and leadership. Equally, public health ethics must provide the 
means of reflection and communication that allow health to be promoted in public and political 
discourse.  This is needed if we are to achieve a fairer society in which health needs are met, with 
particular attention to people who are most vulnerable or disadvantaged. 
 
The discussion in this paper is accordingly built around two questions. The first represents an 
inquiry in political philosophy: what makes health public? The second represents an engagement in 
political science and social activism: how do we make health public? The framing of these questions is 
indicative of the perspectives that we have sharpened on our respective journeys into public 
health ethics and law: one of us entering the field through a route of more ‘detached’ academic 
study; the other coming originally from a background in social advocacy and political 
engagement. 
 
 
* This is the text of the version of this paper accepted for publication in the Journal of Public Health: advance access 
publication 4th July, 2019, available at https://doi.org/10.1093/pubmed/fdz005  
† Centre for Health, Law, and Society; University of Bristol Law School; and Bristol Population Health Science 
Institute, 8-10 Berkeley Square, Bristol, BS8 1HH, UK, John.Coggon@bristol.ac.uk 
‡ O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law, Georgetown Law, 600 New Jersey Avenue, NW, 
McDonough 568, Washington, DC 20001, USA 
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Our argument is that answering these two fundamental questions is essential if a rigorous, 
effective, ethical public health is to be developed. To explain our position, we first reflect on the 
relationships between ethics and public health. We then explore the theoretical work that is 
required if we are to sustain claims that the moral mandate of public health is a compelling one. 
This leads finally to a discussion of the sorts of understanding that are required to move from 
theory to practice: from theoretical to applied and engaged public health ethics. We aim to 
explain the salience of understanding both why and how health is public. 
 
Ethics and Public Health 
 
Nancy Kass shows how public health ethics developed as a field, first from a point of relative 
neglect within bioethics, to a second stage from the years 2000-2002 as an area that saw a surge 
of interest in the development of frameworks, to a third stage where there is a focus on 
questions of justice and populations’ health.4 As the importance of public health ethics as a 
distinct point of inquiry became apparent at the turn of the century, reflections moved to 
considerations of what distinguished public health as an area of activity. Concepts such as 
community, the public, society, and health risks did not prominently feature in the vocabulary of 
mainstream bioethics.5 Scholars in ethics and law needed to examine the sources of the 
distinctive values relevant to understanding the health of the public, and to be able to address 
relevant institutional, social, political, and professional contexts.6 Public health ethics was thus 
concertedly created as a fit-for-purpose area of study and practice, distinct from mainstream 
bioethics. In approaching its distinguishing features, Gostin argued that we could contrast three 
linkages between ethics and public health. The ethics of public health refers to professional 
ethics; the values that come from the practice and institution of public health itself. Ethics in 
public health relates to more critical or analytical understanding as applied to public health: the 
philosophical or bioethical critique of public health activities and agendas. Ethics for public 
health, by further contrast, denotes advocacy or activism directed to the promotion of the 
public’s health.7 
 
These distinct points of ethical departure and application underscore both the importance and 
the diversity of challenges for public health ethics. The dominance of norms and values in 
biomedical ethics are not apt for analysis of questions regarding population health, and create a 
skewed and impoverished analytical environment.8 Furthermore, even within materials ostensibly 
reoriented for appraising and guiding public health ethics, the weighting of individual liberty (of 
course, a value of great importance) is loaded in such a way that other important social values are 
wrongfully discounted.9 Public health ethics as a subject of research, education, and training may 
be seen, therefore, as having emerged with a consciously-embraced need to be able to account 
for and respond to the following tests: 
 
• A need to be conceptually and structurally coherent, and formulated rigorously: guiding 
values could not just be ‘inherited’ or unreflectively drawn from (say) the principle of 
respect for individual autonomy or from professional codes; 
• A requirement to operate in necessarily political, professional, and social contexts: public 
health ethics would not be relevant if it could not address institutions, communities, and 
the roles of public and private actors that impact the public’s health; 
• A necessary potential to have real-world applicability: although its philosophical 
rationales were essential, the lessons from public health ethics needed to have traction in 
order to support transformative agendas. 
 
These requirements set public health ethics apart from mainstream bioethics and clarified the 
importance of its combining meaningful ethical justification with practical mandates concerning 
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public health activities and agendas. As a part of public health itself, public health ethics has to 
be a transdisciplinary field (so e.g. drawing from the expertise of law, which is the primary 
discipline of each of this paper’s authors).10 And it is for this reason that we identify respectively 
the philosopher’s and the activist’s questions as being the two most important questions for 
ethical public health: what makes health public; and how do we make health public? We will 
consider each in turn. 
 
The Philosopher’s Question: What Makes Health Public? 
 
What we are labelling the philosopher’s question allows us to examine the logically prior points 
that form the basis of public health: what does health mean, and what significance is there in 
saying that it is public?11 In relation to the first part of this question, it is well known that health 
is subject to conflicting meanings, from narrow biomedical definitions based on the statistically 
normal functioning of the human organism,12 through to very broad accounts of positive well-
being and human flourishing, such as the World Health Organization’s concept of “complete 
physical, mental and social well-being.”13 There is not a linear spectrum of concepts of health. 
Rather, there is a plurality of accounts, with a notable added dimension when we contrast 
individual and population-level understandings.14 In the present paper, we do not aim to 
advocate for a particular definition, though would urge for the importance of a concept that 
accounts for positive states of well-being, and for the crucial role of population health to our 
understandings of social and political ethics: for example in explaining that and why systematic 
health inequalities are problematic.15 Howsoever the question may be answered, public health 
advocacy and practice require an understanding of what health is, and how health stands in 
relation to other important values. 
 
As well as needing to be clear on the meaning and scope of ‘health’, we need to understand what 
the term ‘public’ denotes. Marcel Verweij and Angus Dawson have produced important 
conceptual analysis exploring the meaning of ‘public’ in ‘public health’. Their work brings both 
explanatory and evaluative understanding: it allows us to explain and critique, and thereby to 
direct, health policy and practice.16 Drawing on dominant definitions of public health, Verweij 
and Dawson highlight two significant implications of ‘public’. First, we have the idea of the 
public’s health: the point raised above that we gain distinct understandings of health when 
studied at a population level. This can include understandings of risk as well as levels and 
incidence of disease. And it allows us to contrast populations within a public, gaining insight not 
just into aggregate levels of health, but also of the distribution of burdens of disease, and of the 
attitudes of different populations to the value of health.  
 
Second, we have a focus on coordinated efforts of social organisation: the methods of effecting 
better health outcomes through institutional interventions. In this sense, health is public because 
it is addressed through collective and targeted social and political measures. No one can alone 
guarantee the health of individuals or populations, as each of us brings a range of capabilities. 
The US Institute of Medicine (now the National Academy of Medicine) famously defined public 
health as “what we as a society do collectively to assure the conditions for health.”17 That is, the 
job of public health is to improve underlying conditions of and for health. To do this ethically, 
we need to be able to establish the proper mandates and constraints under which government 
and lawmakers operate. A principled answer is required, in other words, to the question ‘what 
makes health public?’ This means undertaking a process of reasoning that explains why we 
should consider that a particular matter concerning health is a shared concern: a concern that we 
share with one another as members of a political community. It is by explaining what makes 
health public that we can argue, for example, that smoking tobacco is not just an individual’s 
own business: that smoking is the concern of others, and of the state. 
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To exemplify this, consider the following claim, which members of the public health community 
might treat as self-evident, but which is not and has not historically been treated thus across all 
social, commercial, and political circles:18 that we ought to regulate tobacco use to the point of 
trying to abolish smoking altogether. This is another way of saying that the production, sale, and 
consumption of tobacco products are public matters; matters that are a political concern. How do 
we arrive at this point? 
 
Imagine that someone sits down next to you right now and goes to light a cigarette. The 
following, different lines of reasoning might be given to dissuade her from doing so: 
 
• “Don’t smoke; it’s bad for your health.” This may be characterised as prudential reasoning: 
the rationale for not smoking is presented as advice based on the person’s own well-
being; you are inviting the person to reconsider her decision for her own benefit. 
• “Don’t smoke; it’s bad for the health of other people in the room.” This may be 
characterised as interpersonal reasoning: the rationale for not smoking is presented as a 
moral one; protecting others from harm is presented as the reason for reconsidering her 
decision. 
• “Don’t smoke; it’s prohibited.” This may be characterised as political reasoning: we have 
moved to a rationale based on the exercise of the state’s power; we are saying here that 
the person’s smoking is the government’s business, even if she is unconcerned by harms 
to her own health, or even the health of others. The decision is not hers alone to make 
because smoking is a public matter in this sense. 
 
It is when we move from the personal and interpersonal to the political that we have arrived at a 
position that health has been made public (whether through coercive measures, as indicated in 
the above example, or through other methods of regulation). The ethical task at this political stage 
is to account for why government may be justified in regulating, and why the means chosen are 
legitimate. 
 
The philosophical public health literature is rich with different arguments on the basis of ethical 
justification for making health public. These span radically sceptical positions such as Petr 
Skrabanek’s, which hold essentially that public agencies have no authority to institute health 
improvement measures,19 through to theories such as Jennifer Prah Ruger’s, which hold that 
health is the foundational capability from which human flourishing emanates.20 There is profound 
philosophical disagreement, so we must be able to explain and defend the position that we think 
justifies collective responsibilities for health. It is essential that arguments be clearly made not 
just about what health is, but also how it serves as an ethical—ultimately a political—value. To 
promote public health agendas we need to be able to explain what makes health, and health-
affecting phenomena, a shared concern. We need to explain, for example, why one person’s 
cigarette smoking is the business of other persons in her community, and of the institutions that 
govern that community. 
 
Arguments about what makes health public combine philosophical and empirical analysis of the 
justification of government action across sectors. This is necessarily a political as well as a 
scientific debate. Some scholars, for example, deny the social determinants of health.21 To 
respond to such positions and argue that health is and should be a shared value within a 
community requires both scientific and philosophical critique.22 But so far, the debates simply as 
framed in this section mostly take place in the university seminar room. If health in reality is 
going to be made public, the question ‘what makes health public?’ has to be adapted to account 
for real-world complications concerning social, political, and legal bars that may inhibit perfectly 
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principled and evidence-based arguments that, for example, cigarette smoking is a public 
concern. And this leads to the question for ethical activism and advocacy: ‘how do we make 
health public?’ 
 
The Activist’s Question: How Do We Make Health Public? 
 
Ethics, including public health ethics, can seem to be too abstract for, and detached from, 
practical application. A grounding in the real world is needed if we are to move from asking ‘what 
makes health public?’ to addressing the question ‘how do we make health public?’. We have been 
clear that public health ethics operates within the political sphere, and it can be argued that 
understandings of politics—in how it works and how it might change—come primarily from 
social and political sciences rather than moral and political theory.23 However, works in an area 
that is sometimes labelled ‘public ethics’24 explore the contributions of philosophy to practice 
and policy, taking the sorts of considerations found in the previous section and allowing them to 
inform political reality. In particular, we find that the philosopher’s question provides answers 
that can explain the coherence (or otherwise) of the ideas that underpin practice (provide 
conceptual and analytical clarity) and can rationalise the ethical reasons that motivate our political 
goals and side constraints on policy measures (provide normative reasons).25 
 
For ethical public health, the ‘how’ question links philosophical discussions with understandings 
from political and social sciences, and with real-world experience. Practitioners, leaders, 
advocates, and policy makers seek to understand how different ‘levers’ may be pulled in different 
settings in order to effect change.26 This means recognising that different sorts of reasons and 
strategies are appropriate in different settings.27 Legal, political, and social modes of advocacy 
will all be important, as will be understanding the strategies of actors whose interests are served 
by health-harming agendas (e.g. the tobacco industry).28 The Tobacco Atlas is an excellent example 
of the range of methods of lobbying and advocacy that might be used in practical efforts to 
make health public.29 This important tool for health activism has been developed to advance the 
‘endgame’ on smoking. It rests on a philosophically robust agenda in the senses outlined above: 
our understanding of the harms of tobacco derive from population-level studies; and our 
principled arguments about why these harms are a shared concern relate to the importance of 
health as a value, general social concerns about safeguarding and promoting health, and specific 
arguments about the institutional power dynamics, brute economic clout, and systematic social 
inequalities that are compounded in the context of tobacco-related harm. We can argue that 
tobacco smoking should be a public matter. And to make it this, we have seen, and continue to 
see (e.g. given the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control) regulatory and other strategies 
explained in the Tobacco Atlas that are making smoking—once treated as an intrinsically private 
choice—an increasingly public matter. 
 
In practically seeking to make health public, ethical practice requires three important 
considerations to remain in view. First, the particular public health goal requires a clear ethical 
mandate. Second, the means used to reach that goal needs to be justified; we cannot just defend a 
policy or intervention because its outcomes are well-intended. And finally, we must not lose sight 
of the fact that our public health ethics must ultimately sit within a wholesale public and social 
ethics. In the end, the most compelling arguments to improve health will not be true simply 
because they make sense from a ‘public health perspective’; they will be compelling because they 
make sense from an overall social and political perspective, all things considered. 
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Conclusion: Combining the Academic and the Activist 
 
In this paper, we have emphasised our shared perspectives on public health and ethics, while 
endeavouring to explain what we consider to be the two most fundamental points of inquiry for 
anyone interested in ethics and public health. Formally, the academic’s and activist’s respective 
questions can be separated. However, we hope it is clear how each also feeds into the other, and 
how both are needed. Public health ethics must speak to practitioners, researchers, policy 
makers, and leaders in public health. If we cannot articulate at the level of principle what makes 
health public, and in practice set strategies that will be effective in making health-related 
phenomena a shared concern, ethical agendas to protect and promote the public’s health will not 
be achieved. 
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